Enable pilot abuse limits

.env.example

@@ -234,12 +234,16 @@ PUBLIC_CONTACT_VERIFICATION_MAX_AGE_SECONDS=86400
 PUBLIC_CASE_ACCESS_MAX_AGE_SECONDS=31536000
 
 CODEX_SESSION_ID=copy-the-main-local-codex-session-id
-# Optional shared PostgreSQL-backed policies. Keep {} until product thresholds are approved.
+# Shared PostgreSQL-backed pilot policies. This explicit value makes an
+# operator's effective policy reviewable without inspecting the image. Remove
+# the value to use the same compiled pilot default; set exactly {} only to
+# disable every counter in an isolated benchmark/test environment.
 # Shape: {"action_name":{"limit":POSITIVE_INTEGER,"window_seconds":POSITIVE_INTEGER}}
 # Authentication delivery uses paired email/IP actions:
 # registration_email + registration_ip, magic_link_email + magic_link_ip,
 # password_login_email + password_login_ip, email_change_email + email_change_ip.
 # Public support intake uses support_request (account/email scope) together with
-# support_request_ip (trusted client-IP scope). Choose limits from measured traffic;
-# the application does not invent a universal threshold.
-RATE_LIMIT_POLICIES_JSON={}
+# support_request_ip (trusted client-IP scope). IP ceilings are intentionally
+# higher than account/email ceilings so shared networks are not treated as one
+# person. These are initial pilot product limits, not universal recommendations.
+RATE_LIMIT_POLICIES_JSON={"registration_email":{"limit":4,"window_seconds":3600},"registration_ip":{"limit":120,"window_seconds":3600},"magic_link_email":{"limit":4,"window_seconds":3600},"magic_link_ip":{"limit":120,"window_seconds":3600},"password_login_email":{"limit":10,"window_seconds":900},"password_login_ip":{"limit":300,"window_seconds":900},"email_change_email":{"limit":3,"window_seconds":86400},"email_change_ip":{"limit":60,"window_seconds":3600},"support_request":{"limit":5,"window_seconds":86400},"support_request_ip":{"limit":120,"window_seconds":3600},"content_removal_notice":{"limit":20,"window_seconds":86400},"content_removal_notice_ip":{"limit":120,"window_seconds":3600}}

README.md

@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ access or be restricted. The complete role matrix and operator workflow are in
 ./scripts/bootstrap-admin.sh you@example.com --confirm kind
 ```
 
-## Optional shared action limits
+## Shared action limits
 
 `RATE_LIMIT_POLICIES_JSON` configures atomic PostgreSQL counters shared by every
 web replica. Its shape is:
@@ -612,8 +612,13 @@ web replica. Its shape is:
 ```
 
 The strings above describe the required types and are not a runnable policy.
-Keep `{}` until numeric limits have been approved from policy and observed
-traffic. Supported actions are listed in `docs/trust-safety.md`.
+The shipped pilot policy covers public authentication and anonymous
+support/content-removal intake. Account/email ceilings are lower than IP
+ceilings so a shared network is not treated as one person. The complete
+effective JSON is kept in `.env`; an absent value uses the compiled pilot
+default, while an explicit `{}` disables all counters for isolated load/E2E
+runs. These values are an initial product policy, not universal security or
+capacity thresholds. Supported actions are listed in `docs/trust-safety.md`.
 
 ## Local Kubernetes verification
 

compose.yaml

@@ -29,7 +29,9 @@ x-app-environment: &app-environment
   EMAIL_FROM_ADDRESS: ${EMAIL_FROM_ADDRESS:?Set EMAIL_FROM_ADDRESS in .env}
   SUPPORT_INBOX_ADDRESS: ${SUPPORT_INBOX_ADDRESS:-}
   CODEX_SESSION_ID: ${CODEX_SESSION_ID:-not-configured}
-  RATE_LIMIT_POLICIES_JSON: ${RATE_LIMIT_POLICIES_JSON:-{}}
+  # Empty/unset uses the compiled pilot policy. Set exactly {} only for an
+  # isolated benchmark or test environment that must disable every counter.
+  RATE_LIMIT_POLICIES_JSON: ${RATE_LIMIT_POLICIES_JSON:-}
   PUBLIC_CONTACT_VERIFICATION_MAX_AGE_SECONDS: ${PUBLIC_CONTACT_VERIFICATION_MAX_AGE_SECONDS:-86400}
   PUBLIC_CASE_ACCESS_MAX_AGE_SECONDS: ${PUBLIC_CASE_ACCESS_MAX_AGE_SECONDS:-31536000}
   MAP_TILE_URL: ${MAP_TILE_URL:-https://tile.openstreetmap.org/{z}/{x}/{y}.png}

config/config.exs

@@ -33,7 +33,24 @@ config :who_need_help,
   codex_session_id: "not-configured",
   e2e_routes: false,
   secure_cookies: false,
-  rate_limit_policies: %{},
+  # Initial pilot policy for public authentication and anonymous intake. These
+  # values are product policy, not a claim about universal security thresholds
+  # or database capacity. Runtime JSON can replace the complete map, and an
+  # explicit `{}` disables every shared counter for isolated load/E2E runs.
+  rate_limit_policies: %{
+    "registration_email" => %{limit: 4, window_seconds: 3_600},
+    "registration_ip" => %{limit: 120, window_seconds: 3_600},
+    "magic_link_email" => %{limit: 4, window_seconds: 3_600},
+    "magic_link_ip" => %{limit: 120, window_seconds: 3_600},
+    "password_login_email" => %{limit: 10, window_seconds: 900},
+    "password_login_ip" => %{limit: 300, window_seconds: 900},
+    "email_change_email" => %{limit: 3, window_seconds: 86_400},
+    "email_change_ip" => %{limit: 60, window_seconds: 3_600},
+    "support_request" => %{limit: 5, window_seconds: 86_400},
+    "support_request_ip" => %{limit: 120, window_seconds: 3_600},
+    "content_removal_notice" => %{limit: 20, window_seconds: 86_400},
+    "content_removal_notice_ip" => %{limit: 120, window_seconds: 3_600}
+  },
   public_contact_verification_max_age_seconds: 86_400,
   public_case_access_max_age_seconds: 31_536_000,
   tracking_presence_cleanup_grace_ms: 5_000,

config/runtime.exs

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ app_role =
 rate_limit_policies =
   case System.get_env("RATE_LIMIT_POLICIES_JSON") do
     value when value in [nil, ""] ->
-      %{}
+      Application.fetch_env!(:who_need_help, :rate_limit_policies)
 
     json ->
       case Jason.decode(json) do

config/test.exs

@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ import Config
 
 config :who_need_help, :handover_secret, "isolated-test-handover-secret"
 config :who_need_help, :tracking_presence_cleanup_grace_ms, 100
+# Unit tests opt in to individual policies inside the relevant test. This keeps
+# unrelated examples independent from shared counters and mirrors the explicit
+# `{}` used by the isolated E2E/load environments.
+config :who_need_help, :rate_limit_policies, %{}
 
 # Only in tests, remove the complexity from the password hashing algorithm
 config :bcrypt_elixir, :log_rounds, 1

deploy/helm/who-need-help/values.yaml

@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ app:
   erlangPortLimit: 65536
   clusterInterface: eth0
   codexSessionId: not-configured
-  # Shared limits are opt-in; set only after product policy thresholds are approved.
-  rateLimitPoliciesJson: "{}"
+  # Initial pilot product policy. Use exactly "{}" only for an isolated test
+  # release that intentionally disables every shared counter.
+  rateLimitPoliciesJson: '{"registration_email":{"limit":4,"window_seconds":3600},"registration_ip":{"limit":120,"window_seconds":3600},"magic_link_email":{"limit":4,"window_seconds":3600},"magic_link_ip":{"limit":120,"window_seconds":3600},"password_login_email":{"limit":10,"window_seconds":900},"password_login_ip":{"limit":300,"window_seconds":900},"email_change_email":{"limit":3,"window_seconds":86400},"email_change_ip":{"limit":60,"window_seconds":3600},"support_request":{"limit":5,"window_seconds":86400},"support_request_ip":{"limit":120,"window_seconds":3600},"content_removal_notice":{"limit":20,"window_seconds":86400},"content_removal_notice_ip":{"limit":120,"window_seconds":3600}}'
   publicContactVerificationMaxAgeSeconds: "86400"
   publicCaseAccessMaxAgeSeconds: "31536000"
   mapTileUrl: https://tile.openstreetmap.org/{z}/{x}/{y}.png

docs/architecture.md

@@ -204,10 +204,13 @@ backups and a tested recovery procedure.
 
 Action buckets live in PostgreSQL and use an atomic upsert keyed by action,
 hashed scope, and aligned time window. This works across all web replicas
-without an in-memory or Redis singleton. Policies are supplied through
-`RATE_LIMIT_POLICIES_JSON`; no numeric product policy is compiled into the
-application. Authentication checks combine the email and client-IP buckets in
-one `INSERT ... ON CONFLICT` statement. Failed transactional-email delivery
+without an in-memory or Redis singleton. Policies can be replaced through
+`RATE_LIMIT_POLICIES_JSON`. The compiled pilot default covers authentication
+and anonymous public intake; an explicit `{}` disables all counters for
+isolated test/load runs. Account/email ceilings are lower than IP ceilings so
+shared networks are not treated as one person. These values are product policy
+rather than a database-capacity claim. Authentication checks combine the email
+and client-IP buckets in one `INSERT ... ON CONFLICT` statement. Failed transactional-email delivery
 removes only the token created for that failed attempt. Expired buckets and
 tokens are pruned by the maintenance worker.
 

docs/performance.md

@@ -423,13 +423,13 @@ requests or activities during the observation, and `/requests` and
 joins, chat, tracking, handover, and write throughput therefore remain covered
 by the isolated profiles rather than this public production probe.
 
-The deployed environment had `RATE_LIMIT_POLICIES_JSON={}`. In that
+The environment measured in this historical production observation had
+`RATE_LIMIT_POLICIES_JSON={}`. In that
 configuration `RateLimiter.check/2` returns `:not_configured` without a database
 query, so this observation neither exercises nor validates authentication
 throttling. It also provides no evidence that Redis is needed. The current
-candidate keeps cross-replica counters in PostgreSQL and requires explicit
-email- and IP-scoped policies before public authentication traffic is
-protected.
+candidate keeps cross-replica counters in PostgreSQL and ships a pilot
+email/IP policy; its limiter overhead still requires a separate measured run.
 
 Ignored evidence:
 

docs/support-and-content-removal.md

@@ -167,9 +167,11 @@ resource when an app allows account creation:
 limiter. Public support and content-removal intake each check both their
 normalized account/email scope and the trusted client-IP scope in one database
 statement. This prevents a public submitter from evading the network policy by
-rotating contact addresses. As with the other actions, no numeric policy is
-enabled unless the operator supplies values justified by measured traffic
-through `RATE_LIMIT_POLICIES_JSON`. CSRF protection, validation, exact URL
+rotating contact addresses. The initial pilot policy enables both scope types;
+operators can replace the complete map through `RATE_LIMIT_POLICIES_JSON`, and
+an explicit `{}` is reserved for isolated E2E/load runs. The values are product
+policy, not a universal abuse or capacity threshold. CSRF protection,
+validation, exact URL
 limits, contact verification, staff authorization, and audit events apply
 regardless.
 

docs/trust-safety.md

@@ -87,14 +87,18 @@ verification.
 - Missing optional proximity/movement, repeated pairs, reciprocal direction,
   and configured action velocity create review signals. They do not
   automatically punish an account.
-- PostgreSQL action buckets enforce only operator-supplied policies across all
-  replicas. Registration, password login, magic-link delivery, and email
+- PostgreSQL action buckets enforce the compiled pilot policy or an explicit
+  operator replacement across all replicas. Registration, password login,
+  magic-link delivery, and email
   changes can each be limited by both normalized email and client IP in one
   atomic database statement.
 - No public exact location by default.
 
-No numeric rate policy is enabled by default because no threshold has been
-approved for this deployment. Authentication action pairs are
+The initial pilot policy enables only public authentication, email change, and
+anonymous support/content-removal intake. Its account/email ceilings are lower
+than its IP ceilings so a shared network is not treated as one person. The
+values are product policy rather than universal security or capacity
+thresholds. Authentication action pairs are
 `registration_email`/`registration_ip`,
 `magic_link_email`/`magic_link_ip`,
 `password_login_email`/`password_login_ip`, and

lib/who_need_help/trust/rate_limiter.ex

@@ -2,8 +2,10 @@ defmodule WhoNeedHelp.Trust.RateLimiter do
   @moduledoc """
   Shared PostgreSQL-backed action limits.
 
-  Policies are opt-in and supplied as a map whose values contain positive
-  `limit` and `window_seconds` integers. No product thresholds are assumed.
+  Policies are supplied as a map whose values contain positive `limit` and
+  `window_seconds` integers. The application ships a pilot product policy,
+  while runtime configuration can replace the complete map or explicitly use
+  an empty map for an isolated test environment.
   """
 
   import Ecto.Query

scripts/test.sh

@@ -25,6 +25,16 @@ fi
 run_id="$(date -u +%Y%m%d%H%M%S)-$$"
 image="who-need-help:test-$run_id"
 container="who-need-help-test-$run_id"
+runtime_env="$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/who-need-help-test-env.XXXXXX")"
+chmod 600 "$runtime_env"
+
+cat >"$runtime_env" <<EOF
+MIX_ENV=test
+DB_HOST=db
+DB_USER=$POSTGRES_USER
+DB_PASSWORD=$POSTGRES_PASSWORD
+TEST_POOL_SIZE=${TEST_POOL_SIZE:-10}
+EOF
 
 image_tag_is_referenced() {
   expected_image=$1
@@ -44,6 +54,8 @@ cleanup() {
   cleanup_status=0
   trap - EXIT HUP INT TERM
 
+  rm -f "$runtime_env" || cleanup_status=$?
+
   if docker inspect "$container" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
     docker rm -f "$container" >/dev/null 2>&1 || cleanup_status=$?
   fi
@@ -71,10 +83,6 @@ docker build --target test --tag "$image" .
 docker run --rm \
   --name "$container" \
   --network who_need_help_internal \
-  --env MIX_ENV=test \
-  --env DB_HOST=db \
-  --env "DB_USER=$POSTGRES_USER" \
-  --env "DB_PASSWORD=$POSTGRES_PASSWORD" \
-  --env TEST_POOL_SIZE="${TEST_POOL_SIZE:-10}" \
+  --env-file "$runtime_env" \
   "$image" \
   mix test