who_need_help/docs/operations.md

# Operations runbook

This runbook describes the commands that are implemented and verified in this
repository. It does not claim a production recovery point objective, recovery
time objective, retention period, storage capacity, or high-availability model;
those values require product policy and measurements from the eventual
production environment.

## Compose database backup

Create a PostgreSQL 18 custom-format archive, validate its table of contents,
and write a SHA-256 manifest:

```bash
./scripts/backup-compose.sh
```

The default destination is the ignored `output/backups/` directory. An explicit
new destination may be supplied as the only argument. The command refuses to
overwrite either an archive or its checksum manifest and writes through
temporary files before publishing the final pair. Files and newly created
directories are restricted by `umask 077`.

The archive covers the configured application database. PostgreSQL cluster
globals such as roles and tablespaces are not part of `pg_dump`; deployment
credentials and database roles must be provisioned separately from secrets.
Local backup files on the same workstation are not an off-site backup.

## Encrypted local S3-compatible backup drill

The isolated load project can run a complete encrypted Restic/MinIO drill:

```bash
./scripts/load-stack-up.sh
./scripts/backup-s3-drill.sh local-encrypted-backup
```

The script refuses the staging Compose project and validates the project and
service labels of every pre-existing container in its scope. On first use,
`scripts/ensure-local-load-env.sh` generates independent random MinIO and
Restic credentials in ignored `.env.load` and restricts that file to mode
`0600`. MinIO publishes Docker-assigned ports only on `127.0.0.1`; the observed
API and console URLs are printed after a successful run.

The backup tool combines the matching PostgreSQL 18 client with pinned Restic
rebuilt on Go 1.26.5. MinIO server and client are also rebuilt as non-root
Alpine images from checksum-pinned upstream source commits with the exact
dependency updates recorded in `Dockerfile.minio`. The quality gate verifies
their reported release, commit, Go runtime, configured user, and current
HIGH/CRITICAL vulnerability scan. `restic backup --stdin-from-command` runs a
custom-format `pg_dump`, checks the producer exit status, encrypts the data,
and uploads it directly to MinIO. No plaintext database dump is written to the
host. The drill then:

1. runs `restic check --read-data`;
2. streams `restic dump` into `pg_restore --list`;
3. restores into a uniquely named database created from `template0`;
4. checks tables, current Ecto migrations, PostGIS, and release migration
   readiness before removing that exact database;
5. clones and corrupts an isolated repository and requires both check and dump
   to fail;
6. stops an exact scoped in-progress backup container only after encrypted
   objects reach MinIO, requires zero published snapshots, prunes unreferenced
   packs, and rechecks the repository;
7. removes and verifies removal of the corruption/interruption buckets and
   requires source table counts to remain unchanged.

The successful encrypted bucket is deliberately retained in the named local
MinIO volume. Non-secret evidence is written under ignored
`output/backups-s3/<run-label>/`; the runtime scratch directory is under
ignored `tmp/backup-s3/`. Use a unique lowercase run label of at most 32
characters. The command refuses to replace an existing retained bucket.

MinIO server and client are AGPLv3. `Dockerfile.minio` identifies the exact
upstream source commits and contains the dependency changes and complete build
commands used here. Before distributing or publicly operating modified images,
review the license and make the corresponding source available as required;
this runbook does not provide legal advice.

This verifies encryption, local S3 protocol use, restore mechanics, and two
failure paths on the observed workstation. A MinIO volume on that same
workstation is not an off-site backup and does not establish production RPO,
RTO, retention, capacity, key custody, object locking, or database HA.

## Local external-service boundary drill

Run the OAuth, SMTP, and provider-neutral push protocol checks without public
credentials, a server, or host-published ports:

```bash
./scripts/external-boundaries-run.sh local-boundaries
```

The script creates a uniquely named Compose project on an internal-only Docker
network. It generates independent one-run OAuth and push credentials in an
ignored mode-`0600` environment file, builds the production release plus a
non-root standard-library Python protocol mock, and then verifies:

1. GitHub-compatible OAuth authorization, PKCE S256, token exchange, normalized
   user lookup, state mismatch, provider rejection, one-time-code replay,
   a fresh flow after a temporary token error, and a token timeout;
2. SMTP acceptance, permanent recipient rejection without retry, one retry
   after a temporary greeting failure, a greeting timeout, and the result of
   submitting the same message twice;
3. the disabled default push boundary plus HTTP success, permanent rejection,
   one temporary retry, replay deduplication, and deduplication after an
   ambiguous timeout using the same idempotency key;
4. a fresh PostGIS database, current migrations, and two Oban worker replicas;
   request acceptance and new-chat domain transactions enqueue stable
   user-recipient events, replay is deduplicated before HTTP, an injected
   temporary chat delivery fails its first Oban attempt and completes on its
   second, and private message text is absent from the push payload.

The evidence JSON and mock state contain counters, booleans, normalized
identity fields, payload digests, run-scoped user/event identifiers, and the
privacy-safe notification metadata asserted by the drill. The script fails if
any generated secret appears in retained evidence. Its trap validates exact
Compose labels, removes only that project, volumes and one-run images, and
deletes the temporary credential file. Failure logs are retained under the
same ignored evidence directory.

This drill uses the application's real Assent/Req and Swoosh/gen_smtp clients,
but the providers are local. It therefore verifies client-side protocol and
product integration, not GitHub, SMTP-provider, FCM, or APNs availability.
SMTP permits duplicate delivery after ambiguous outcomes, so the result
explicitly makes no exactly-once claim. Push currently targets a stable
`user:<uuid>` recipient; selecting a provider, registering device tokens, and
resolving that user to devices remain deployment/provider work.

The implementation follows the configured adapter interfaces and protocol
semantics documented by
[Assent 0.3.1](https://hexdocs.pm/assent/0.3.1/Assent.HTTPAdapter.html),
[GitHub OAuth](https://docs.github.com/en/apps/oauth-apps/building-oauth-apps/authorizing-oauth-apps),
and [SMTP RFC 5321](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5321).

## Isolated restore drill

Run a real restore into a uniquely named temporary database:

```bash
./scripts/restore-drill-compose.sh output/backups/compose-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS.dump
```

The drill:

1. validates the SHA-256 manifest;
2. validates the archive table of contents;
3. creates a pristine database from `template0`;
4. restores with `pg_restore --exit-on-error`;
5. reads every restored public application table and checks the PostGIS
   library;
6. runs the current immutable release's migrations and migration-readiness check
   against only the temporary database;
7. drops only the temporary drill database and verifies that it is gone.

A trap also attempts to drop the exact temporary database if a check fails.
The source application database is never passed to `pg_restore`, `dropdb`, a
clean operation, or the drill migration runner. The drill intentionally does
not compare an older backup's row counts to the live source, because concurrent
legitimate writes or a historical archive would make that comparison invalid.

## Isolated Compose upgrade rehearsal

After creating a current custom-format backup, run the complete current release
against an isolated restored copy:

```bash
./scripts/upgrade-rehearsal-compose.sh \
  output/backups/compose-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS.dump
```

The rehearsal validates the checksum and archive catalog, reads the public
origin configuration from ignored `.env`, and uses only the independently
generated credentials in ignored mode-`0600` `.env.e2e`. It builds a uniquely
tagged production release, creates a uniquely named Compose project and
database from `template0`, restores the archive, records application-table
counts, and then:

1. applies every current timestamped Ecto migration;
2. requires the localized category column and all 11 valid cursor indexes;
3. starts 2 web and 2 worker replicas behind the isolated Traefik instance;
4. requires the four-node BEAM cluster and cross-node PubSub probe;
5. checks the production HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect, trusted-proxy public pages,
   and both health endpoints;
6. requires an empty before/after diff for every public application table
   except the expected migration and Oban-internal tables;
7. removes and verifies removal of the exact containers, networks, database
   volume, and one-run image.

The input archive is read-only and is not copied into the evidence directory.
The ordinary Compose project, source database, public route, and running
containers are outside the generated project scope. Non-secret evidence is
retained under ignored mode-`0700`
`output/upgrade-rehearsal/<run-id>/`, with files mode `0600`.

## Service checks

```bash
docker compose ps
curl --fail http://localhost:4010/healthz/live
curl --fail http://localhost:4010/healthz/ready
./scripts/verify-realtime-cluster.sh compose
```

`live` verifies that the web process can serve HTTP. `ready` additionally runs
`SELECT 1` through the configured Ecto repository. The cluster probe subscribes
on one connected BEAM node and broadcasts from another.

Health checks do not replace alerting, database backups, restore drills, or
application-level synthetic checks.

## Local failure and rolling-replacement drills

The isolated load project can exercise process crashes, sequential container
replacement, and a real Oban retry without touching the normal Compose project:

```bash
./scripts/load-stack-up.sh
./scripts/load-resilience-run.sh local-resilience
```

The resilience script refuses `LOAD_PROJECT=who_need_help` and verifies the
Compose project/service labels of every container before stopping it. It:

1. continuously calls readiness through the isolated Traefik route;
2. terminates the BEAM process in one web and one worker container and requires
   Docker's observed restart count to increase;
3. removes and replaces each web and worker replica one at a time;
4. waits for every configured BEAM node, then runs the cross-node PubSub probe;
5. enqueues a side-effect-free local worker that fails its first Oban attempt
   and succeeds on its second;
6. removes that exact Oban row and requires no fixture domain rows to remain.

Traefik's retry middleware is attached to the HTTP and local TLS routers. Its
attempt count is an environment input. Traefik retries transport failures and,
with the checked configuration, does not opt in to retrying non-idempotent
requests. This reduces a stale-backend window; it is not a claim of production
availability.

For the project-owned kind cluster, run:

```bash
./scripts/kind-rolling-verify.sh local-kind-rollout
```

That script requires both the kind ownership marker and the control-plane
cluster label before invoking `rollout restart`. It changes only the web and
worker Deployment pod templates. It snapshots application-table counts before
and after, continuously probes the observed Docker mapping for the chart's
NodePort, requires all four old pod UIDs to disappear, waits for the exact BEAM
peer count, and verifies cross-node PubSub. PostGIS, its hostPath, the
Kubernetes Secret, and the namespace are not recreated.

The rollout timeout, probe interval/timeout/retry count, and cluster-join
timeout are experiment inputs. They are not production SLOs or resource
requirements.

## Protected Prometheus metrics

The web role exposes Prometheus text format at `/metrics`. It requires the
independent `METRICS_TOKEN` deployment secret:

```bash
curl --fail \
  --header "Authorization: Bearer $METRICS_TOKEN" \
  http://localhost:4010/metrics
```

The endpoint returns `401` without the exact token, disables response caching,
and does not put the credential in a URL. The reporter exports cumulative HTTP
request and duration, router exception, database query and duration, WebSocket
connection, VM memory, and scheduler run-queue metrics. Cumulative durations are
integer microseconds because the selected reporter's sum accumulator is
integer-based; divide by `1_000_000` in PromQL when seconds are required.
Definitions intentionally have no request path, user, request, or event-name
labels that could create unbounded cardinality.

Metrics are local to each BEAM process. Discover and scrape every web pod or
container as a distinct target and preserve Prometheus's `instance` label. A
request through the load-balanced public route reaches only one replica and is
therefore useful as an authorization/smoke check, not as a cluster-wide
aggregate.

The isolated load project includes a local observability profile:

```bash
./scripts/load-stack-up.sh
./scripts/observability-run.sh local-observability
```

The run script refuses the staging project, validates every current web
container's Compose labels, and writes a `file_sd` target for each observed
internal IP. Prometheus reads the Bearer value from a mode-`0600` runtime file,
not a tracked config or URL. Its direct request includes the internal
`X-Forwarded-Proto: https` signal required by the application's production SSL
rewrite while preserving the target's own `instance` label.

Prometheus, Alertmanager, and Grafana are pinned by tag and digest. Their host
ports default to Docker-assigned values bound only to `127.0.0.1`; the run
prints the observed URLs. Grafana uses the random admin password generated in
ignored `.env.load`, disables anonymous signup, update checks, suggested plugin
installation, and its unused built-in alert engine. The Prometheus datasource
and four-panel dashboard are provisioned from tracked files.

The verification stops exactly one scoped load web container. The
`WhoNeedHelpWebReplicaUnavailable` rule is based only on the factual
`up == 0` result; it is a local failure drill, not an invented latency,
capacity, or production SLO threshold. The script requires both firing and
resolved webhook payloads from Alertmanager, starts the same container, waits
for every direct target, and compares read-only database counts before and
after. Evidence is retained in `output/observability/` without the metrics or
Grafana secrets.

Stop only the monitoring services with:

```bash
./scripts/observability-stop.sh
```

Prometheus/Grafana/Alertmanager retention, production notification
destinations, production availability, and measured alert policies remain
deployment decisions. In Kubernetes, put the metrics token in
`existingSecret`; configure the external scraper to send it as a Bearer token.

## Rollback boundary

The release image is immutable and migrations run as a separate one-shot role.
Before a schema rollout, create and restore-test a current backup. Application
rollback and database migration rollback are separate decisions: do not run an
Ecto down migration merely because an image is rolled back. Inspect the exact
migration and compatibility boundary first.

The repository intentionally does not ship an automatic destructive production
restore command.